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Afghanistan is the Obama Administration’s most urgent foreign and defense policy 
issue.  President Obama is considering coopting susceptible Taliban members into a 
new Afghan government, and the Administration even advocated and participated in an 
international conference on Afghanistan, held at the Hague on March 31, where Russia 
and Iran, among other interested parties, were represented in what has been noted as 
the “Obama administration’s biggest overture so far” to Iran. (1)  These policies confirm 
the dire situation in Afghanistan where President Obama, following numerous reports 
since 2008, concurs in the view that the US is not winning. (2)  While Russia repeatedly 
has reiterated its desire to cooperate with the United States and has allowed the transit 
of non-lethal supplies through its territory, its attitude actually has been rather negative. 
(3)  Earlier this year, Moscow combined intimidation (by means of a cyber-strike against 
the Kyrgyz state) with offers to relieve its economic decline by loans and buyouts of key 
Kyrgyz industries that produced naval weapons for the Soviet Union. Moreover, Russia 
continued exerting diplomatic pressure to secure the ouster of the US from its base at 
Manas in Kyrgyzstan. (4)
Nevertheless, Russia has several reasons not to want an American defeat in 
Afghanistan.  This goes beyond the correct, but trite, observation that fundamentalist 
Islam, if victorious there, could then ignite a widespread destabilization of Central Asia.  
A Taliban victory would threaten not just the stability of the despotic regimes of Central 
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Asia, many of which are in serious trouble now because of the global economic crisis, it 
also would pose serious dilemmas to Russian foreign and defense policy. 
First of all, it would endanger one of the foundations of Russia’s economic and foreign 
policy, notably its ability to compel Central Asian energy supplies to flow primarily 
through Russia and then on to Europe, or simply to Russia itself, so that in effect 
Central Asia subsidizes Russia’s energy consumption.
Second, a Taliban victory in Central Asia would put the onus of defending the region 
squarely on Russia’s shoulders, and Moscow cannot bear that burden.  Although 
Moscow steadily has built up its military capabilities in Central Asia to create an 
integrated land, sea, and air force, those forces, by Moscow’s own admission, are not 
ready for contemporary warfare. Hence the current large-scale efforts at military reform 
that are running into trouble by virtue of the economic crisis. (5)  While the purpose of 
these forces and those of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), is to 
defend Central Asia against foreign military threats, in fact the reality is less than it 
seems.  The CSTO is just getting started and it is doubtful that its forces could be 
effective in combating a victorious Taliban and native insurgents.  Although the CSTO 
claims that its forces will be used only for defense against foreign aggression and 
terrorism (as opposed to domestic uprisings against local governments) it is hard to see 
what else it could do, for it is hardly ready to tackle the Taliban. (6)  We should 
remember that in 1999-2001, when the terrorist threat first materialized, Russia offered 
many promises but failed to deliver timely and effective material assistance to 
threatened Central Asian regimes, two of which then opted for US bases after 9/11.  
Since Russia has continued to fail to keep its promises of aid to states like Tajikistan 
and is unlikely to deliver the full aid it has promised to Kyrgyzstan, Moscow cannot 
afford to find itself in a situation where it then must deliver or lose positions in Central 
Asia.  For this reason, it clearly prefers to have NATO and the US fighting in Afghanistan 
(also because it distracts them from Europe) to prevent a Taliban victory.
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Another, and increasingly important Russian concern is the drug war that its politicians 
say is being waged upon it from Afghanistan. (7)  President Medvedev has claimed that 
cooperating to shut down the growing drug trade is the most significant aspect of the 
conflict in Afghanistan. (8)  Russian and Central Asian governments have been 
understandably critical of previous US policy regarding the drug trade and the protection 
of traffickers in the Afghan government, for that trade has wreaked havoc upon their 
countries.  According to Viktor Ivanov, head of the Federal Narcotics Control Service, 
the production of opiates in Afghanistan has grown by 44 times since the deployment of 
US troops there in 2001.  250 youngsters become addicts daily and 30,000 persons a 
year, or 82 a day, die from Afghan heroin – double the number of losses in the Soviet-
Afghan war of 1979-89. (9)
Not surprisingly, Ivanov and other officials repeatedly have demanded that NATO and 
US forces step up the campaign against the Afghan drug trade. (10)  Some Central 
Asian analysts, e.g. the Kyrgyz analyst Leonid Bondarets, argue that the threat from 
Afghanistan is not one of fomenting insurgencies, but of narcotics, and he therefore 
calls for closing Central Asia’s borders with Afghanistan. (11)  But, this will not work 
unless the war is brought to a “victorious” conclusion.  According to Ivanov, Russia is 
now the world’s biggest heroin consumer and absolute leader in the opiate trade, and 
90% of Russian addicts are hooked on Afghan heroin.  Worse yet, there are some 2.5 
million addicts out of 140 million Russians, and most of them are in the critical 18-39 
year age bracket.  Indeed, Ivanov claims that it is impossible to control the Russian-
Kazakh border through which most of this heroin reaches Russia, thus shining a cold 
light on Bondarets’ proposal.  The situation in today’s Russia resembles that of China at 
the turn of the 20th century, when almost a quarter of Chinese men consumed heroin 
and 5% were addicted. (12)
There are compelling reasons for Russian cooperation with the US on Afghanistan.  
Nevertheless, the desire to confront Washington and secure other goals has taken 
priority. The motivation for this stems partly from the current crisis, as Russia is 
attempting to forge a ruble union and economic bloc with the Central Asian states, in 
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order to shore up the ruble’s value.  But, it is pursuing this goal also in order to create 
an exclusive closed trading and economic bloc, not unlike Germany in the 1930s. (13) 
More specifically, it seeks to consolidate a Eurasian Economic Community as a single 
economic space—i.e. a trade, customs, and ruble bloc—and to intensify cooperation in 
key sectors, such as energy, intelligence, and the military-technical field.  Russia's 
impetus for cooperation in these areas springs, in part, from an intention to prevent the 
Central Asian states from deepening their ties with China and the West. (14)
More to the point, Russia both pressured and bribed Kyrgyzstan into ousting the US 
from its base at Manas. (15)  This made clear its intention to follow through on President 
Dmitriy Medvedev’s claim that Russia has privileged interests and relations with CIS 
members to the exclusion of all other rivals. At the same time it demonstrated that the 
sovereignty of the Central Asian states and their right of free choice in military partners 
are of no importance to Moscow, compared to its own imperial interests.  Third, for all its 
talk about a willingness to cooperate with Washington against terrorism, in fact, Russia 
regards the preservation of its neo-imperial patrimony as more urgent a task than the 
defeat of terrorism. (16)  In other words, Washington cannot take at face value the oft-
voiced sentiment that Moscow really wants cooperation with Washington against 
terrorism in Central Asia and Afghanistan.  This argument merely projects American 
ideas concerning what Russia’s interests should be onto the Russian government, and 
then plays them back to Washington audiences as if they were fact.  Such mindless 
mirror-imaging cannot serve as an adequate basis for policy or strategy, especially 
since it finds no basis in what Russian leaders do or say.  Russia does seek cooperation 
on Afghanistan, but only after ensuring that its imperial requirements, which can only 
promote greater instability across the region, come first. (17)
As General Charles Callwell (Victorian England’s leading theorist of small wars) wrote, 
“theory cannot be accepted as conclusive when practice points the other way.” (18)  
Indeed, for all its talk of cooperation, it appears Moscow actually fears that the US and 
NATO are losing in Central Asia and therefore seeks a hedge against that outcome, 
even as it seeks greater cooperation with them (albeit exclusively on its own terms).   As 
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Fedor Lukyanov, Editor of Russia In Global Affairs, stated, “the consensus of Russian 
experts is that there is no winning strategy for the US and NATO in Afghanistan.” (19)  
Moreover, Moscow is now determined to act unilaterally to strengthen border defenses 
and defense ties with the Central Asian states, having determined that  cooperation with 
NATO does not benefit it. (20)  Indeed, many analysts in and out of the Russian 
government have argued that the US, having invaded Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11 
and supposedly having failed to win in both, let loose the drug crisis that threatens 
Russia’s vital interests in the Caspian basin. (21)
Thus, when President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan, sensing Washington’s loss of 
support for him, approached Moscow about arms sales to Afghanistan, it replied 
affirmatively, but stipulated that there must first be a political agreement between the 
two governments and that NATO and Russia must resume the dialogue broken during 
the war with Georgia. (22)  In other words, Moscow’s interests, not surprisingly, take 
precedence over fighting terrorism.  As an Afghan newspaper observed, “The Russian 
President’s letter to Karzai is a warning to the American government.  Considering the 
recent American-Afghan disputes, Russians would not want to get involved in a weak 
game in Afghanistan by supporting a government that is in its last days.  But, 
strategically, Russia wants to strengthen its presence in the region as a partner equal to 
America and NATO.” (23)
Sergei Rogov, Director of the prestigious and well-connected Institute for the Study of 
the USA and Canada in Moscow, has hinted what Russian agreement with the Karzai 
government and the Obama Administration about Afghanistan might mean.  Speaking in 
Washington on January 13, 2009, he stated:
“The only way to achieve some stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan is to invite 
Russia to join the IFOR (International Forces there more commonly known as ISAF-
author).  Russia should accept responsibility for Regional Economic Reconstruction 
Teams in [the] Northern provinces.  Russian teams should be supported by security 
personnel.  The key problem will be to include Russia in the political decision-making 
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mechanism on Afghanistan while Russia remains a non-member of NATO.  A possible 
solution may be giving additional functions to the NATO-Russia Council, or creation of 
[a] special body with decision-making authority.  The Soviet experience in Afghanistan 
makes Russia very unenthusiastic about another engagement in this county.  It will 
demand an extra effort from the new US Administration.” (24)
While Moscow may still have—or may profess to have—an Afghanistan syndrome and 
therefore will not send troops to the area, such ideas as a division of Afghanistan into 
spheres of responsibility and a new Russian military presence there as a leverage point 
to insert itself into NATO raise so many objections that they are non-starters for any 
serious discussion of the matter.  Certainly, this is not an acceptable foundation for 
cooperation with the US on Afghanistan, as it would provide only a basis for either 
unending or future conflict.  Indeed, Moscow confirms Henry Kissinger’s observation 
that the past conduct of Afghanistan’s principal neighbors does not augur well for a 
policy of restraint, opposition to terrorism, and we might add, non-intervention in its 
politics. (25)
But Rogov’s formula, plus Moscow’s decision to send military aid to Afghanistan also 
suggest Russia’s apprehension that the Taliban might win, thus leaving Russia to 
confront that movement with no means of dealing with it politically or of insulating 
Central Asia from it.  Indeed, it is clear that Moscow is making every effort to enmesh 
the Central Asian regimes even further in various forms of economic, trade, and defense 
integration that would preclude them from being able to act effectively in defense of their 
own sovereignty.  Likewise, Moscow’s abortive efforts to obtain approval from the 
Central Asian governments for its unilateral revisions of Georgia’s borders in August 
2008 represent another sign of its basic contempt for their sovereignty, an attitude the 
Central Asian states seem to recognize.   From the beginning of his tenure, Putin’s first 
priority, and one that remains Russia’s central foreign policy priority, is to establish an 
exclusive sphere of influence in the CIS and to revitalize the existing institutions of 
cooperation, or even create new ones in defense, intelligence sharing, and overall 
economic policy, including trade and energy. (26)
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In conjunction with this overriding goal, Moscow called its own conference of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which met on March 27 to discuss 
Afghanistan. (27)  It is clear that a primary aim of this conference, to which NATO sent 
two representatives, was to obtain NATO’s recognition for the SCO as a legitimate and 
effective security interlocutor—and for the CSTO as the main military security provider 
in Central Asia—thus securing Russia’s objective of excluding the Central Asian states 
from any direct independent dialogue with NATO and maintaining its position as their 
principal security interlocutor for them. (28)  These are long-standing Russian aims, 
particularly regarding the CSTO. (29)  Indeed, Medvedev sees the CSTO, especially its 
new rapid reaction force as becoming a “universal effective instrument” that ensures 
security throughout the whole former Soviet space. (30)  Essentially, he wants NATO to 
accept the CSTO’s military writ over the entire area and the SCO’s political authority 
there as well, and thus to bow out of the picture in the CIS.  This is not very different 
from the proposal made by then Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov in December 2006 for 
a division of Eurasia into spheres of influence with regard to  peace operations and 
security guarantees. Ivanov then claimed that,
“The next logical step on the path of reinforcing international security may be to develop 
a cooperation mechanism between NATO and the CSTO, followed by a clear division of 
spheres of responsibility.  This approach offers the prospect of enabling us to possess a 
sufficiently reliable and effective leverage for taking joint action in crisis situations in 
various regions of the world.” (31)
Not only is this a frank call for spheres of influence and for Russia to create a security 
system akin to a solar system in which smaller neighboring states revolve around 
Russia, it also returns us to the strategic bipolarity of the Cold War, albeit in vastly 
changed conditions. (32)
From Russia’s standpoint the SCO conference and the conference sponsored by the 
US should lead not only to NATO’s acceptance of spheres of influence in Eurasia, they 
should also bring about an Afghan government consonant with traditional values (i.e., 
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not an “imposed” democracy or any other kind of democracy for that matter), which will 
recognize the sphere of influence suggested by Rogov. (33)  Whatever else the US is 
fighting for in Afghanistan, it is doubtful that this is the outcome it prefers, or what it has 
in mind when it advocates greater cooperation with Russia.
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